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APPROACH": A SOLUTION FOR THE
MIXED MESSAGES BATSON GETS
FROM EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
INTRODUCTION
The decision in Batson v. Kentucky' recognizes the defendant's
right to challenge the prosecution's peremptory challenges if it is
shown the prosecutor is using the challenges to discriminate against
potential jurors on the basis of race. After a showing of possible dis-
crimination, the prosecutor has the opportunity to give a legitimate
reason for his strike. Sometimes the prosecutor will defend his strike
by giving mixed motives that include a race-neutral and a race-based
reason. Mixed motives are problematic because they include a race-
based reason that the Batson decision prohibits, along with a race-
neutral reason that standing alone would be an acceptable reason to
exercise a peremptory challenge.
Courts have taken two approaches when dealing with challenges
that evince mixed motives: the "dual motivation" approach and the
"tainted decision-making" approach. The dual motivation approach
has been imposed on Batson challenges, as a result of courts' use of
an imperfect analogy between jury discrimination and employment
discrimination. The dual motivation approach permits the peremptory
challenge if the prosecutor can show he would have struck the juror
regardless of the race-based motive. The tainted decision-making
approach will not permit the peremptory challenge if a prosecutor
gives any race-based reason. Because Batson challenges are intended
to rid the jury selection system of racial discrimination, only the
tainted decision-making approach deals effectively with this problem.
I 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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Part I of this Note examines the history and evolution of peremp-
tory challenges in the American judicial system with a specific focus
on the decision in Batson v. Kentucky.2 Part II examines the mixed
motive problem of peremptory challenges. Specifically, it explores
which motives are legitimate and which are illegitimate under Batson
when striking a juror. It will also explore the two distinct approaches
courts have taken to resolve this mixed motive problem. Part III de-
tails the relevant history of mixed motives in employment discrimina-
tion and details different courts' approaches to resolving mixed mo-
tives in employment decisions. Part IV examines the analogy between
employment discrimination jurisprudence and Batson challenges. It
explains why the only proper test when mixed motives are present
during the exercise of a peremptory challenge is the tainted decision-
making approach.
I. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND BATSON V. KENTUCKY
A. Peremptory Challenges
To achieve impartiality in the jury, both sides in a trial are allowed
to shape the selection of the jury. This is accomplished by challenging
a certain number of potential jurors that the parties believe will be
biased for one reason or another.3 The number of challenges depends
on the type of challenge, the party, the type of case, and the jurisdic-
tion of the trial.4 What typically happens in jury selection is as fol-
lows: A group of potential jurors (known as the venire) is called into
the courtroom and questioned by the judge and attorneys (referred to
as voir dire).5 The court usually inquires into the background of the
jury panelists, such as their residential area, marital status, occupa-
tion, and prior jury service. The attorneys can then question the poten-
tial jurors to identify any biases that may cause the jurors to be par-
tial.6 In both civil and criminal cases, the parties are then allowed to
exercise challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.7 Challenges
for cause are unlimited in number but require the challenging attorney
2 While peremptory challenges are exercised in criminal and civil trials for race and gen-
der discrimination, this Note is primarily concerned with racial discrimination in criminal trials.
3 Arielle Siebert, Batson v. Kentucky: Application to Whites and the Effect on the Per-
emptory Challenge System, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 307,309 (1999).
4 Id. atn.12.
5 Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by
Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 985 (1996).
6 Id. The presumption in federal court is that the judge will conduct voir dire with input
from the attorneys.
7 Michelle Mahony, The Future Viability ofBatson v. Kentucky and the Practical Impli-
cations ofPurkett v. Elem, 16 REv. LITIG. 137, 138 (1997).
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to give an adequate explanation of why he believes the juror would
not be able to be impartial in deciding the case. 8 Peremptory chal-
lenges are limited in number and were intended to be "exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry, and without being subject to
the court's control." 9
The peremptory challenge was originally seen as an unconditional
right to strike a juror based "on nothing more than a gut feeling, or
mere speculations, either real or imagined."' 0 The justification for
such a concept is that no one should be subjected to the judgment of a
man whom he believes will be prejudiced against him, even if he is
unable to articulate a reason for the supposed bias." Peremptory chal-
lenges are important in voir dire because they promote justice and
fairness in the judicial process.' 2 They are viewed as a means for as-
suring the Sixth Amendment right to a jury that is fair and impartial.
13
Challenges allow the parties to be involved in choosing the jury,
which gives both the parties and the potential jurors a sense of control
and faith in the system.' 4 Peremptory challenges are used to strike
jurors that were not excused by the judge as a result of a challenge for
cause, but whom the defense attorney still believes will be biased.' 5
While peremptory challenges are a fixture in the trial process, they
are not a constitutional right and have been subject to a few chal-
lenges of their own. This is the first dimension of the Batson paradox:
peremptory challenges are meant to be exercised based on intuitive
feelings and not subject to the courts' reach. However, judicial deci-
sions have placed limitations on peremptory challenges, making them
subject to the court's scrutiny by forcing attorneys to disclose their
reasons for striking jurors they believe will be biased.
B. Modifying the Peremptory Challenge to Prevent Discrimination
In the wake of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Strauder
v. West Virginia16 first addressed discrimination in the jury selection
process. '7 In 1880, the Supreme Court held that the West Virginia law
8 Quin M. Sorenson, Backdooring Batson: The Improper Use of Racial Memory and
Other "Peculiar" Characteristics in Juror Challenges, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 71, 74
(2003); Mahony, supra note 7, at 985.
9 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10 Mahony, supra note 7, at 140.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *346-47.
12 Siebert, supra note 3, at 309.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 309-10.
Is Id.
16 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
17 Id.; see also Siebert, supra note 3, at 311 (arguing Batson should be limited in order to
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excluding African-Americans entirely from jury service violated the
equal protection rights of an African-American defendant.' 8 The opin-
ion in Strauder emphasized the Court's awareness of the historic dis-
crimination that persisted against African-Americans. The Court held
that although a defendant did not have a right to a petit jury that nec-
essarily included members of his own race, he was entitled not to
have racial discrimination play a part in the selection of jurors.' 9 The
Court recognized discrimination in the jury selection process as a
threat to equal protection. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Jury
Selection and Service Act in 1968,20 which implemented a random
jury pool selection procedure that did away with potential discrimina-
tion on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or eco-
nomic status. 21
In 1965, the Court revisited the issue of racial discrimination in the
jury selection process in Swain v. Alabama.22 The Court held that if a
defendant could show the state was using their peremptory challenges
to systematically exclude all African-Americans from the jury, then it
would be a violation of the defendant's right to equal protection.2' An
African-American defendant raised the issue on appeal claiming his
death sentence that an all-white jury imposed was based on discrimi-
natory practices during jury selection. 24 Out of the eight African-
Americans chosen to serve on the venire, two of the potential jurors
were exempt and the other six were removed by the prosecutor who
exercised his peremptory challenges.25 Apparently this was not a rare
occurrence in Alabama; specifically, the Supreme Court noted that
the State had used its challenges to prevent any African-American
26from serving on a petit jury for the entire previous generation. The
Court weighed the benefits of the peremptory challenge with the po-
tential harm in violating the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right
preserve the important safeguard peremptory challenges provided to the Sixth Amendment right
to a trial by an impartial jury).
18 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310. This opinion from over a century ago recognizes that the ex-
clusion of African-Americans from a jury and passing judgment on an African-American is
constitutionally wrong and should not be allowed. This Note marvels at how there is still a
question of why courts should ever allow a racially motivated peremptory challenge.
19 Strauder, 100 U.S. 303.
20 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-69 (West 2000).
21 Id. §§ 1862-63.
22 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled inpart by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 203-04.
25 Id. at 205.
26 Id.; see also Sorenson, supra note 8, at 77 (finding it alarming that the state of Alabama
had been able to use its challenges so as to prevent any black person from serving on a petit jury
in the previous decade).
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to equal protection.27 Despite the alarming evidence of a pattern of
systematic discrimination, the Court held the State's use of peremp-
tory challenges did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection guarantee. 28 The Court viewed the peremptory challenge as
a means of eliminating "extremes of partiality on both sides" that can
be based on "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices" that
the court could not comprehend.29
In a seemingly contradictory statement, however, the Court went
on to say that where the State used its peremptory challenges in a way
that amounted to the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from
the jury, the benefits would not outweigh the equal protection in-
fringement. 30 In reviewing challenges to the use of peremptory chal-
lenges, the Court would presume the State acted properly in exercis-
ing its peremptory challenges based on the case, the defendant, and
the crime, not based on racial prejudice.31 Therefore, a remedy would
be available if the defendant were able to show "in case after case,
whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the
defendant or victim may be," that the prosecution used its peremptory
challenges consistently and systematically to exclude all African-
Americans from serving on any petit jury. 32 Swain fell short of meet-
ing this almost impossible burden of proof, and the Court upheld his
conviction by an all-white jury.33
In practice, the "limitation" the Court imposed on peremptory
challenges was more of a slap on prosecutors' wrists than an actual
limitation. Many jurisdictions did not keep records of jurors' races or
even a transcript of the voir dire process, which were necessary to
overcome the presumption of nondiscrimination.34 The decisions in
Swain and Strauder were moving in the right direction towards equal
protection in the jury system, but they still provided minimal protec-
tion for a defendant from the racially discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges.
27 Swain, 380 U.S. at 224, 226-28. The racially discriminatory use of a peremptory chal-
lenge in this case appears to be directed at the excluded juror because African-Americans were
excluded from jury service when the defendant was Caucasian as well. However, racial dis-
crimination against jurors who are the same race as the defendant can have a profound effect on
the outcome of the defendant's trial, which implicates his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection of the laws and a potential deprivation of liberty.
28 Id. at 221, 225-26.
29 Id. at 219-20.
30 Id. at 222-23.
31 Mahony, supra note 7, at 142-43.
32 Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
33 Id at 224.
34 Mahony, supra note 7, at 144.
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C. Batson v. Kentucky
The Supreme Court appeared to make the largest step forward in
1986 when it decided Batson v. Kentucky.35 In Batson, the Court reaf-
firmed that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the exercise of per-
emptory challenges in a way that discriminates against members of
the venire on the basis of race. 36 The case involved an African-
American defendant accused of burglary and the receipt of stolen
goods.37 During voir dire, the judge excused certain jurors, and the
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to remove the four remain-
ing African-Americans from the venire. 38 An all-white jury convicted
Batson, and he argued on appeal that the prosecution executed its
peremptory challenges in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a
jury representative of a cross section of the community and against
his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law.39
The Batson Court articulated three specific harms that result from
the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. First, dis-
criminating against potential jurors on the basis of race violates the
defendant's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.40 Second, the excluded juror's right to equal protection is vio-
lated because the exclusion of people from jury service based on their
race is unconstitutional. 41 Third, the "state's continued participation in
a judicial system that discriminates against individuals based on their
race harms the community as a whole by destroying its confidence in
and regard for the judicial system as a whole. ' 2 The Court was care-
ful in constructing a test that would replace the burdensome Swain
test but not impede the legitimate goal of the peremptory challenge.
The Court reduced the defendant's burden by allowing him to
challenge a prosecutor's peremptory strikes based only on his case,
making it no longer necessary to show a pattern of behavior in
multiple cases.43 The test for making a Batson challenge is broken
into three parts. First, the defendant must "show that he is a member
of a cognizable racial group . . . and that the prosecutor has exercised
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the
35 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 82.
38 Id. at 82-83.
39 Id. at 83-84.
40 ld. at 86.
41 Id. at 87.
42 Mahoney, supra note 7, at 147-48.
43 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93. Evidence of a pattern of discriminatory behavior is still one
of the primary methods of making a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.
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defendant's race." 44 If the defendant is able to make this prima facie
case, then the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a
nondiscriminatory reason for striking the jurors in question.45 If the
prosecution asserts a race-neutral reason, the defendant is required to
show that the prosecutor was engaging in "purposeful discrim-
ination" 6 and the reason given by the prosecutor was actually "a
pretext for racial discrimination.
' 47
To determine which race-neutral reasons will satisfy this second
prong of the test, the Supreme Court said in Purkett v. Elem48 that the
explanation does not need to be "persuasive, or even plausible. ' 49 The
primary issue in determining neutrality is the facial validity of the
prosecutor's explanation. 50 Barring a discriminatory intent that is in-
herent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed race-neutral. 5' The Court said the reason can be "silly or su-
perstitious" and still satisfy the second prong of the test.52 The actual
juror at issue in the Purkett decision was struck because he "appeared
to [the prosecutor] to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that
[he] had long hair hanging down shoulder length, curly, unkempt
hair."
53
Under the third prong of the test, explanations that appear "silly"
are tested to make sure that they are not pretexts for race-based rea-
sons. The defense can generally establish pretext by demonstrating
that similarly situated members of another race were seated on the
jury.54 Other evidence demonstrative of a pretext includes: explana-
tions for challenges not related to the case, a lawyer's failure to mean-
ingfully question or question a juror at all, disparate treatment in the
questioning of African-American jurors, explanations that are sugges-
tive of race or gender such as an assumption on the attorney's part
that an African-American would be less likely to convict another Af-
rican-American, or a vague explanation for the strike such as "teach-
44 Id. at 96.
45 Id. at 97.
46 Id. at 98.
47 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363 (1991) (plurality opinion).
48 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
49 Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-68. The legitimacy of the asserted reason is challenged in the
third step of the inquiry. See also Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme
Court's Utter Failure To Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 WIs. L.
REV. 501,504 (1999) (examining "neutral explanations" given to defend a Batson challenge).
50 Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 766.
54 Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 208 (S.C. 1998).
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ers are liberal" without any questioning to suggest the particular juror
is liberal.55
There are many examples of attorneys striking potential jurors
based on pretext. A court found an attorney to have asserted a pretex-
tual reason when he struck a Latino allegedly based on his residence
but did not remove a non-Latino juror living in the same area.56 An_
other court found an instance of pretext where a prosecutor did not
challenge a Caucasian teacher and a Caucasian nurse's assistant but
struck an African-American whose spouse was a teacher and an Afri-
can-American nurse because teachers are too precise to understand
circumstantial evidence and the nurse had a specialized medical
background.57 A pretextual reason for racial discrimination was also
found where Caucasian jurors who had children near the same age as
the defendant were not struck, but African-American jurors with chil-
dren of a similar age were removed.58 However, if the judge deter-
mines that the reason given for the strike was not pretextual, the juror
will not be stricken. Therefore, as long as the reason given for the
strike is not racially discriminatory on its face, and it is not a pretext
for an illegitimate reason, the juror will be struck.
The decision in Batson has been extended over the last twenty
years to include discrimination when the defendant and the excluded
juror are not of the same race 9 and discrimination based on gender.6°
Moreover, Batson now protects civil litigants as well as criminal de-
fendants.61 Batson continues to be the subject of litigation and aca-
demic discussion primarily because of the many paradoxes inherent in
the decision.
D. The Batson Paradox
The decision in Batson is paradoxical for several reasons. If the
defendant makes a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent in the
use of the challenge, the prosecutor is required to provide a nondis-
criminatory justification for striking the juror.62 Here is the first di-
mension of the paradox: a peremptory challenge is meant to allow
potential jurors to be stricken based solely on an intuitive feeling by
55 William C. Slusser et a]., Batson, J.E.B., and Purkett: A Step-by-Step-by-Step Guide to
Making and Challenging Peremptory Challenges in Federal Court, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 127,
152-55 (1996) (providing examples of evidence of pretext).
56 U.S. v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989).
57 People v. McDonald, 530 N.E.2d 1351, 1358-59 (I11. 988).
58 People v. Washington, 651 N.E.2d 625, 629 (III. App. Ct. 1995).
59 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 400 (1991).
60 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 127 (1994).
61 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 614 (1991).
62 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
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the prosecutor that the juror would be biased.63 Yet, the decision in
Batson forces the attorney asserting the peremptory challenge to pro-
vide a reason for his intuitive belief that the juror will not be fair and
impartial.
The second dimension of the Batson paradox is the Court's com-
plete rejection of the "idea that a juror's race or gender has any bear-
ing on how that juror will view the evidence in a case or vote on the
question of guilt or innocence." 64 Therefore, if the racial composition
of the jury has no effect on the outcome of the trial, there is no harm
to the defendant when the state uses their peremptory challenges to
exclude members of a certain racial group. The Court has been
somewhat schizophrenic regarding whether or not it believes that
generalizations about people's beliefs can be made based on race and
gender.65 In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,66 the Court approved
litigation that gave certain minorities a preference when issuing
broadcasting licenses because it is "a legitimate inference ... to draw
that as more minorities gain ownership and policymaking roles in the
media, varying perspectives will be more fairly represented on the
airwaves. 67 The Court supported the idea that it was rational to at-
tribute certain broad views and preferences to minority groups.68 This
same attribution of viewpoints was scolded by the Court in Miller v.
Johnson,69 where voting districts were drawn according to minority
voters under the assumption that minorities share the same political
views.7°
Prior to the Batson decision, the Court clung to the "theory of dif-
ference," or the idea that a juror's race or gender is at the very least a
minimal predictor of his or her perspective. 71 The Court said in sev-
eral decisions that "a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is
excluded" from juries.72 In Taylor v. Louisiana73 and Peters v. Kif74
63 Siebert, supra note 3, at 309.
64 Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and
the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 96 (1996) (providing an interesting overview of this
concept and the studies that support it).
65 Id. at 97-107.
66 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (overruled on other grounds).
67 Id. at 582.
68 Id.
69 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
70 Id. at 927 (explaining that in order for society to cleanse itself of discrimination, elec-
torates cannot be carved into racial blocs).
71 Muller, supra note 64, at 98-99.
72 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 194 (1946); see also Ford v. Kentucky, 469 U.S.
984, 987 (1984); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 (1975); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405
U.S. 625, 638 (1972).
73 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (holding "the selection of a petit jury from a representative
cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a
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the Court expressed the importance of having a cross section of the
community participate in jury service. Without this cross section, the
primary function of the jury is eviscerated as qualities of human na-
ture and experience are excluded. 75 The language in Batson and sub-
sequent decisions, in contrast, solidified the Court's opinion that race
and gender are impermissible predictors of juror perspective, at least
for the time being.76
II. THE MIXED MOTIVE PROBLEM AND
How COURTS HAVE DEALT WITH IT
When the prosecution uses a peremptory challenge to strike a mi-
nority from the venire and the defense raises a Batson challenge and
makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, the prosecution is
required to justify their use of a peremptory challenge to strike the
juror. To survive the Batson challenge, the asserted reason must be
nondiscriminatory and must not be a pretext for a discriminatory rea-
son. Courts have upheld the following reasons as legitimate and non-
discriminatory: the juror might be overly sympathetic toward criminal
defendants,77 the juror was familiar with the crime scene,78 a state-
ment by the juror that he could not be fair,79 the juror's lack of mental
capacity,80 the juror's membership in a sympathetic religion,81 and the
juror's knowledge of the language that is to be interpreted in the
case.
82
Sometimes the prosecutor will assert two motives, one that is le-
gitimately race-neutral along with an illegitimate, discriminatory rea-
son. When defending his peremptory strike, an attorney might say
that he struck the African-American juror because he was tardy and
jury trial," and striking down a Louisiana system that allowed women to "opt-in" to jury ser-
vice).
74 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (granting a writ of habeas corpus where a Caucasian defendant
was indicted and convicted by a grand jury and petit jury from which African-Americans were
systematically excluded).
75 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that litigants may not stri-
ke potential jurors on the basis of gender). But see Muller, supra note 64, at 100-01 (arguing
race and gender do not suggest a particular viewpoint and therefore Batson should be a harmless
error).
76 Muller, supra note 64, at 101.
'n United States v. Hill, 249 F.3d 707, 714 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Donald P. DeRiggi,
Appellate Court Guidance on Batson Challenges, 215 N.Y.L.J. 48, 1,4 (1996) (describing the
approach to pretext used by the New York Court of Appeals).
78 People v. Simmons, 594 N.E.2d 917, 918 (N.Y. 1992).
79 People v. Bennett, 614 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (App. Div. 1994).
80 People v. McArthur, 577 N.Y.S.2d 490, 490 (App. Div. 1991).
81 Id.
82 People v. Hernandez, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85,87 (App. Div. 1990).
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therefore he would likely be inattentive during the trial. The attorney
might also say that he struck the juror because he is a member of the
NAACP. The first reason, that the potential juror was tardy, is race-
neutral because on its face being tardy is not associated with one par-
ticular racial group. The second reason, being a member of the
NAACP, is not race-neutral.83 The NAACP's principle concern is the
equal treatment of African-Americans and the membership of the
group is traditionally African-American.84 Striking a juror because he
or she is a member of the NAACP is a reason that would be associ-
ated with a particular racial group and is therefore not race-neutral. A
race-neutral reason combined with a race-conscious reason is known
as a mixed motive problem in the resolution of the Batson challenge.
Mixed motives are problematic in Batson challenges because the
court does not know if the juror was struck because of the racially
discriminatory reason, which would violate Batson, or if he was
struck because of the legitimate reason. The United States Supreme
Court has not addressed whether the existence of a discriminatory
reason for a peremptory strike is sufficient proof for a Batson chal-
lenge if a nondiscriminatory reason has also been provided. Lower
courts have resolved this mixed motive problem in a Batson challenge
using two approaches: (1) the tainted decision-making approach and
(2) the dual motivation approach. 85 Remember, the dual motivation
approach allows the prosecutor to use a peremptory challenge if he
can show he would have struck the juror regardless of the race-based
motive, whereas, the tainted decision-making approach will not per-
mit the peremptory challenge if the prosecutor gives any race-based
reason.
A. The Tainted Decision-Making Approach
The first approach taken by some courts when assessing a Batson
challenge is the tainted decision-making approach.86 The basic prem-
ise of this approach is that any time a racially discriminatory reason is
asserted when using a peremptory challenge, the purpose of Batson
83 Somerville v. State, 792 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
84 Id. at 268 n.6.
85 McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1112-13 (Ind. 2004).
86 Id. at 1113; see Rector v. State, 444 S.E.2d 862, 865 (Ga. App. 1994) (finding the inva-
lid reason tainted the other valid reasons); Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205 (S.C. 1994) (hold-
ing that once a discriminatory reason has been uncovered, it taints the entire jury selection
procedure); Moore v. State, 811 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (finding a Batson violation
where a juror would have a problem assessing punishment (valid) and was a member of a mi-
nority club (invalid)); United States v. Greene, 1993 CMA LEXIS 4 (C.M.A. 1993) (holding
strike violated Batson because the invalid reason vitiated the valid reasons).
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has been undermined and the selection process has been tainted.87
Justice Marshall wrote in his Wilkerson v. Texas8 8 dissent from a de-
nial of a writ of certiorari that Batson requires a race-neutral reason
for striking a juror and "[t]o be 'neutral,' the explanation must be
based wholly on nonracial criteria." 89
The Supreme Court of Indiana recently adopted this approach to
solve the mixed motive problem in McCormick v. Indiana.9° McCor-
mick involved an African-American defendant who was indicted for
dealing cocaine. 91 Only two African-Americans were called to serve
on the venire, and one was removed on a challenge for cause.92 The
State sought to used a peremptory challenge to remove the only re-
maining African-American on the venire.93 McCormick raised a Bat-
son challenge, claiming the State was improperly removing all Afri-
can-Americans from the jury.94 Removing the only African-American
juror through the use of a peremptory challenge constitutes a prima
facie showing of discrimination.95 Therefore, the burden shifted to the
prosecutor to show his decision to strike the juror was race-neutral or
to give "an explanation based on something other than the race of the
juror."96
There were two prosecutors working on the case; when challenged
regarding their reasons for striking the only remaining African-
American on the venire, one asserted a race-neutral reason, and the
other offered a racially discriminatory reason.97 The first prosecutor
thought the juror looked uncomfortable, was distraught, and gave
98answers that made her seem uncomfortable with the process. The
other prosecutor thought the juror would have a difficult time "pass-
ingjudgment on... a member of ones [sic] own in the community."99
The reference to "one's own community" was clearly directed at the
fact that the defendant and the challenged juror were both members of
the African-American community. 100 Thus, the State presented sev-
87 McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1113.
88 Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924 (1989) (mem.) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 926.
90 McCormick, 803 N.E.2d 1108.
91 Id. at 1109.
92 Id. at 1109-10.
93 Id. at lIl0.
94 Id.
95 Ashabraner v. Bowers, 753 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ind. 2001); McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d
1281, 1284 (Ind. 1997); Graham v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1096, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
96 McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at I I I I (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359
(1991) (plurality opinion)).
97 Id. at 1110.
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eral reasons for striking the juror, some legitimate and one that was
illegitimate because of the racial connotation.10 1 After a brief analysis
of the dual-motivation and tainted decision-making approaches, the
Supreme Court of Indiana held it is inappropriate to analyze Batson
claims under the dual motivation approach. 10 2 The court held the
tainted decision-making approach is the proper approach and is the
only way to protect against the most blatant discriminatory practices
in the jury system that Batson is designed to prevent.10 3
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Payton v. Kearse' 4 also
held the tainted decision-making approach was the proper way to
resolve Batson challenges that evince mixed motives. 105 Payton in-
volved a civil suit for damages resulting from an automobile acci-
dent.'0 6 Both parties were African-American, and the respondent used
all of his peremptory challenges to remove white members of the ve-
nire.' 0 7 The petitioner requested a Batson hearing and the trial court
held that the respondent offered race-neutral reasons for the strikes
and there was no Batson violation. 0 8 The South Carolina Supreme
Court found that the respondent's rationale for striking one of the
jurors was facially race-based: "[s]he herself has not had any prob-
lems but she comes from a family that's had some problems with the
law and she's kind of what we refer to as a redneck variety, so to
speak, and that was the reason we struck her."' 1 9 The use of the term
"redneck" in the respondent's explanation is not race-neutral as red-
neck connotes a specific sentiment about Caucasians. "0
The South Carolina court decided to use the tainted decision-
making approach because, "as applied, Batson is only effective
against the most obvious examples of racial and gender prejudices. To
excuse such obvious prejudice because the challenged party can also
articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for the peremptory strike would
erode what little protection Batson provides against discrimination in
jury selection."' 11
101 d. at 1112.
1021d. at 1113.
103 Id. The Supreme Court of Indiana also said the tainted decision-making approach is the
approach that is consistent with the United States Supreme Court decision in Purkett.






"Old ("The term 'redneck' is a racially derogatory term applied exclusively to members
of the white race. The use of the term 'redneck' is not a valid race-neutral reason to strike a
potential juror, and therefore, the strike is facially discriminatory and violates Batson.").
"'1d. at 210.
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B. The Dual Motivation Approach to Batson Challenges
The second approach taken by lower courts is the dual motivation
approach. 1 2 This approach is modeled after the "same decision"
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis, which provides that
claims may be rebutted by showing the same decision would have
been made without the allegedly discriminatory conduct. This test
was developed in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Educa-
tion v. Doyle,' 13 an employment discrimination action, and is the same
analysis used in housing discrimination, labor/employment discrimi-
nation, and voting rights cases. 14 In the Batson context, the dual mo-
tivation approach requires the prosecutor to show that he would have
exercised a peremptory challenge to remove the juror regardless of
the discriminatory motivation.115 A Batson violation occurs only
when the legitimate reasons were not sufficient by themselves to
strike the juror. 1 6 This test has also been described as the "but for"
test: but for the prosecutor's discriminatory use of his peremptory
challenges, the juror would not have been removed.17
Justice Marshall commented on the two approaches in a dissenting
opinion against a denial for a writ of certiorari Wilkerson v. Texas.18
Richard Wilkerson was found guilty of murder by an all-white jury
from which African-Americans had been excluded. During voir dire,
the prosecution used peremptory challenges to remove all four Afri-
can-Americans from the venire. After his sentencing, Wilkerson
raised a Batson claim on a petition for habeas corpus. The prosecutor
admitted considering that the excluded juror and the defendant were
"
2 See Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 235 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1049 (2002);
Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1032 (8th Cir. 2001); Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271,
1274-75 (1 ith Cir. 1996); King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327, 1335 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Plas-
ter, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995); Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1993).
The majority of these cases cite Mt. Healthy School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (1977), which is evidence of their reliance on the employment discrimination frame-
work. See also Ross P. Brooks, Comment, Mixed Messages: Texas' Two Highest Courts Deliver
Conflicting Opinions Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment Mixed Motive Doctrine as Applied
in the Context of Batson/Edmonson Juror Exclusion Hearings, 6 SCHOLAR 311, 324 (2004)
(noting that Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), extended Batson equal
protection rights to civil litigants).
113 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
1 4 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1985) (holding statute restricting Af-
rican-American voters invalid based on its racial motivation); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977) (holding plaintiffs did not meet burden
of showing denials of requests for rezoning were a result of racially motivated discrimination).
1 5 McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1112-13 (Ind. 2004) (ultimately rejecting use of
dual motivation analysis in this context).
1161d
.
"17 Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 926 (1989) (mem.) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"'Id. at 925-28.
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African-American and feared that might impact the juror's decision-
making process." 9 With regard to a different excluded juror, the
prosecutor admitted that he was concerned the African-American
juror would be sympathetic to the defendant because they would iden-
tify with one another. 20 The state trial court found in favor of the
State, denying the Batson claim and the case was eventually appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.
Marshall wrote that the dual motivation approach is improper for
the Batson context because of the special difficulties that arise when a
prosecutor is required to prove that his motive was legitimate. 121 Mar-
shall pointed out that there can be no meaningful review of a prosecu-
tor's intention in exercising a peremptory challenge, because in order
to assess the reason stated for using a challenge, the court must also
look at the prosecutor's reasons for not striking a juror. 22 No expla-
nation is necessary for not exercising a challenge; therefore, there is
nothing on record to compare the prosecutor's use of his chal-
lenges. 23 Marshall wrote the only way to resolve this conflict is to
trust the prosecutor's claim that he did not exercise the challenge in a
discriminatory manner. "A judicial inquiry designed to safeguard a
criminal defendant's basic constitutional rights should not rest on the
unverifiable assertions of a prosecutor who, having admitted to racial
bias, subsequently attempts to reconstruct what his thought process
would have been had he not entertained such bias."'
' 24
The dual motivation approach allows the parties to openly
consider a potential juror's race or gender when making peremptory
strikes. 25 This concept could not be more antithetical to the decision
in Batson that forbade the use of race as a motive in making
peremptory challenges.' 
26
III. MIXED MOTIVES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
As noted in the previous section, the dual motivation approach to
solving mixed motive problems in Batson challenges is based on the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis used in employment
1I91d. at 925.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 926.
122 1d. at 927.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 927-28.
125 Brooks, supra note 112, at 336.
126 Id.
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discrimination cases. To assess the validity of the two approaches to
mixed motives in Batson claims, it is important to understand how the
U.S. Supreme Court went about analyzing equal protection claims
involving employment discrimination. The Court's decision in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green established the framework for
analyzing an employment discrimination case that was later used in
Batson claims. In Mt. Healthy School District Board of Education v.
Doyle, the Court established the same decision affirmative defense for
the employer in a discrimination case where both legitimate and ille-
gitimate factors lead to the adverse employment decision. This is the
same test as the dual motivation approach that some courts have
adopted to decide Batson claims with mixed motives. The Court's
decisions in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and Desert Palace v. Costa
settled the question of what evidence the plaintiff needs to produce to
prevail in an employment discrimination case where mixed motives
are present.
A. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
The test the Supreme Court established for proving employment
discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green'27 was the
foundation for the Batson burden shifting framework. 128 McDonnell
Douglas involved an employment discrimination action brought by an
African-American male who was laid off by his employer and subse-
quently participated in a demonstration in protest of the employer's
alleged racially discriminatory employment practices. 129 When the
plaintiff reapplied for a position, he was turned down on the basis that
he participated in the demonstration against the defen-
dant/employer. 130 Plaintiff argued this reason was a pretext for the
defendant's discrimination against him based on his race. 131 He filed a
discrimination complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII). 32
The Court laid out the requirements for making a prima facie Title
VII disparate treatment claim requiring the plaintiff to prove that:
133
he is a member of a protected class; he is qualified and applied for an
127 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
128 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 & n.18 (1986).
129 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794.
13°d. at 795.
131 Id. at 796.
132 1d.
133 Disparate treatment is a type of employment discrimination where an employer treats an
employee or an applicant less favorably than he would another employee or applicant based on
his or her race, religion, gender, or national origin. LEX K. LARSON, LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 1.09 (2005).
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available position; he suffered from an adverse employment action;
and finally, the circumstances suggest an inference of discrimina-
tion. 134 Once the plaintiff asserts a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the employer to "articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son" to justify the action against the plaintiff.135 If the defendant is
unable to articulate such a reason, the plaintiff wins. 136 If the defen-
dant is able to provide a justification, however, then the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show that the employer's reasons were merely pre-
textual and the true reason for the decision was discrimination.'37
While this framework seemed to work in theory, in practice it failed
to account for those employers who took an adverse employment
action based on mixed motives.
B. Mt. Healthy School District Board of Education v. Doyle
The Supreme Court recognized that there could be both legitimate
and illegitimate motives influencing employment decisions in Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.138 The case
involved a nontenured teacher who was involved in several incidents
during his employment by the school district. 139 The first incident was
an argument between Doyle and another teacher in which both parties
were suspended. The second incident occurred while Doyle was su-
pervising the cafeteria: two female students refused to obey him so he
made an obscene gesture at them. 140 Other incidents included calling
students names and arguing with a cafeteria worker about the size of
the portion he was given. 141 The final incident involved Doyle calling
a local radio program and revealing information about a memoran-
dum that the principal issued to teachers about a potential dress code
for teachers. 1
42
The school board made the decision not to rehire Doyle for the up-
coming school year citing a "notable lack of tact in handling profes-
sional matters," the frequent incidents involving students, and the
disclosure to the radio station about the memorandum. 143 Doyle ar-
gued that the First Amendment protected his call to the radio sta-




138 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
139Id. at 281.
14 Doyle, 429 U.S. at 281-82.
14[ Id.
142 Id. at 282-83 & n. 1.
143 Id. at 282.
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tion. 44 The Supreme Court agreed that this was protected speech for
which he could not be terminated. 145 However, because the school
district cited other factors for terminating Doyle's employment, a
mixed motive issue was present. 146 The Court said that the proper
approach to Doyle's claim was to require him to prove that the pro-
tected conduct was a substantial factor in the decision to terminate his
employment. 147 The school district very well could have made the
same decision not to rehire him prior to Doyle making the call to the
radio station, and the termination would have been permissible.
Therefore, Doyle was not be entitled to the reinstatement of his posi-
tion if it would result in retaining a position he would not otherwise
have retained absent the call to the radio station. 48 This is referred to
as a "same decision" affirmative defense, for which the Court over-
looks a discriminatory reason if the same decision would have been
reached if only the legitimate ones were present.'
49
C. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
The decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins150 recognized that
when employment decisions are made based on legitimate and
illegitimate motives, McDonnell's burden shifting framework is an
improper guide.' 51 Price Waterhouse involved a female senior
manager for Price Waterhouse's office in Washington, D.C.152 After
five years of employment, she was nominated for partnership, which
was voted on by the company's Policy Board. 53 Her nomination
came with excellent performance reviews, including securing a
twenty-five million dollar contract "virtually at the partnership
level.' 54 It is worth noting that out of the 662 employees of Price
Waterhouse at the time of Hopkins's employment, only 7 were
female. 155 Hopkins' promotion was put on hold and she was
144 Id. at 283-84.
45d. at 287 (referring to both a "substantial factor" and "motivating factor" in the same
sentence of the opinion to describe the plaintiff's burden of proof to prove that the conduct in
question was prohibited).
1461d. at 283-84 (noting Doyle received a letter stating he was being terminated for a lack
of tack in professional matters and the call to the radio station).
147 Id. at 287.
148 Id. at 285-86.
149d. at 285; see also LARSON, supra note 133, § 135.04 (requiring the defendant to plead
the affirmative defense and bear the burden of proof to show that he would have made the same
decision regardless of the illegitimate reason).
150 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
151 Id. at 241.
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subsequently informed she would not be reconsidered for a promotion
based on what Hopkins believed to be gender discrimination. 56 In
addition to the disparate ratio of male to female employees, Hopkins
was chastised both openly and in the recommendations for
partnership based on her unfeminine appearance and approach.'
57
The Court rejected the McDonnell Douglas framework for cases
involving mixed motives but did not reject the use of circumstantial
evidence to prove discrimination in a mixed motive case.158 The plu-
rality opinion held that a plaintiff may prevail in a mixed motive case
by providing evidence that the employer's adverse decision was mo-
tivated by unlawful discrimination. 59 However, it went on to say the
same decision affirmative defense sanctioned in Mt. Healthy would
be a complete bar to liability for employment discrimination. 160 This
decision seems counterintuitive: a plaintiff can prevail if he presents
evidence that the challenged action was discriminatory, but if the em-
ployer can show the action would have happened regardless of the
discrimination, then the plaintiff will lose. The Court stated its deci-
sion was a balancing of burdens between protecting employees from
discrimination and retaining the employer's freedom to make em-
ployment decisions. 161 The recent decision in Desert Palace v.
Costa162 finally settled the debate over what a plaintiff must prove in
order to prevail in a mixed motive case.
D. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc.
Catharina Costa filed a disparate treatment claim against her for-
mer employer, Caesar's Palace Casino, after she was terminated al-
legedly based on disciplinary problems. 63 Costa was the only female
operating forklifts and pallet jacks in a warehouse at Caesar's Palace
Casino. 164 Costa received comments on her work such as "good" and
"excellent" but was also subjected to disciplinary action and sexist
156 1d. at 233 n.1.
157 Id. at 235.
58Id. at 251.
1
59 Id. at 258.
160Id. (requiring the employer to prove they would have made the same decision by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence).
161 Id. at 239; see also Jennifer R. Gowens, Note, Plaintiffs' Direct Evidence Burden in
Mixed-Motive Disparate Treatment Cases: An Analysis in Light of Costa v. Desert Palace, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 149, 165 (2003) (explaining the Costa decision and Justice O'Connor's
"direct evidence" requirement).
162 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
163 Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff'd, 539
U.S. 90 (2003).
164 Costa, 299 F.3d at 844.
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remarks to which her male coworkers were not similarly subjected. 65
Costa cited several examples of incidents where she was warned or
suspended for missing overtime and using foul language yet male
counterparts engaging in the same conduct were not disciplined. Cae-
sar's Palace Casino terminated Costa after she was physically as-
saulted in an elevator at Caesar's warehouse. Despite photographs of
her injuries and an eye witness account of the incident, she was ter-
minated and the other employee was merely suspended. 1
66
Costa filed suit claiming that her disciplinary record was not the
only factor in her termination, but the fact that she was female also
played a part in the adverse employment decision. 67 The district court
instructed the jury how to decide the case based on the mixed motive
evidence presented. The defense objected, saying the plaintiff failed
to meet the required "direct evidence" burden under Price Water-
house to show that sex was a motivating factor in her termination.
68
The jury found in favor of Costa; the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's mixed motive instruction; and the
Supreme Court heard the case on a writ of certiorari.
The Supreme Court held that section 2000e-2(m) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 unambiguously requires that a plaintiff need only
show that an employer used sex as a consideration in the employment
decision.169 The statute does not require a heightened "direct evi-
dence" burden as Justice O'Connor suggested in her concurring opin-
ion in Price Waterhouse.170 The relevant language of the statute reads
that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the com-
plaining party demonstrates that ... sex ... was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also moti-
vated the practice.' 17 1 The Court went on to hold that the statute does
not require direct evidence in a mixed motives employment discrimi-
nation case. The plaintiff is only required to "present sufficient evi-
dence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a mo-
tivating factor for . . . any employment practice.','17 2 This decision
165 Id. at 844-46.
166Id. at 846.
167 d.
168 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 96-97 (2003).
169 1d. at 98.
170 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 275 (1989) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (arguing that "in order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to
the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate
criterion was a substantial factor in the decision").
11 Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 94 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
172 Id. at 101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
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makes mixed motives in the employment discrimination context a
nonissue because any gender or race-conscious motivation, regardless
of the number of neutral motivating factors, is sufficient to prevail on
a discrimination claim. While the Court might finally have figured out
the proper analysis for mixed motives in employment discrimination
cases, it did not necessarily resolve the same issue in Batson claims.
IV. WHY THE USE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION SOLUTIONS Do
NOT RESOLVE THE MIXED MOTIVE PROBLEM IN BA TSON
CHALLENGES
In Batson, the Supreme Court noted that the disparate impact cases
relating to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explained the
analytical structure for a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimi-
nation. 173 The Court used the framework from employment discrimi-
nation to illustrate how Batson challenges should be handled. Lower
courts have expanded the use of the Fourteenth Amendment's dual
motivation doctrine as used in employment discrimination, to Batson
challenges. 74 While these extensions of Fourteenth Amendment ju-
risprudence make sense in theory, the dual motivation approach fails
in practice to achieve the asserted goals of Batson. Courts should re-
ject the employment discrimination analysis, especially in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Costa.
A. Harmless Error Analysis
There are a variety of errors that can take place during a trial.
Courts classify these errors as either trial errors or structural de-
fects. 175 Trial errors are mistakes that happen while the case is pre-
sented to the jury, such as allowing illegally obtained evidence to be
admitted. 76 Once an error is committed and identified as a trial error,
the Court then employs a harmless error analysis.177 The harmless
error analysis requires the reviewing court to examine the error in
light of the entire record to determine whether the error might have
made a difference in the outcome of the trial. 78 Consider a hypotheti-
cal trial at which the following evidence was presented: eyewitness
173 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18 (1986).
174 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
175 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 307-09 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
176 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307.
17 1d a178M r. at 307-08.
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testimony that he saw the defendant commit the crime and evidence
connecting the defendant to the crime, found at the defendant's
apartment after a legal search. Hearsay evidence, that should have
been excluded, was also admitted at the defendant's trial. This hear-
say evidence would likely be viewed as a harmless error in light of
the overwhelming weight of the rest of the evidence and the convic-
tion would likely be affirmed.
The other type of error is a structural defect.' 79 Structural defects
are the type of errors that affect the trial so deeply that it is impossible
for the trial to have been fair and impartial, and the verdict rendered
was essentially a nullity. 80 The Supreme Court has identified certain
errors as structural defects: a biased judge, the denial of counsel, de-
nial of the right to a public trial, the denial of the right of self-
representation, and the exclusion of African-Americans from a grand
jury when the defendant is African-American.' 81 Structural defects are
considered offensive to the reliability of a trial.182 They are implicitly
viewed as making the trial inaccurate and therefore require per se
reversal of the defendant's conviction. 83 Although the harmless error
analysis has been used more and more to resolve constitutional crimi-
nal procedure questions, federal courts have generally considered
Batson violations to be structural defects. 1
84
While the debate whether race has any effect on the juror's deci-
sion as to guilt or innocence continues, the Supreme Court remains
silent about how these factors affect a juror's outcome.1 85 This is
ironic considering lower courts deem Batson violations to have such
an integral impact on the outcome of the trial that they demand per se
179 Id. at 309.
18 ld. at 310.
181 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986) (holding exclusion of Afri-
can-Americans from the grand jury is never a harmless error); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168, 174 (1984) (holding denial of a right to self-representation violates the Sixth Amendment);
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46-47 (1984) (holding denial of the right to a public trial is only
justified if narrowly tailored to serve an overriding need for closure); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding denial of the right to counsel precludes the possibility of a
fair trial); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927) (holding a biased judge is never a harmless
error).
182 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.
183 E.g., Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1994) ("In effect, then, the harmfulness
of structural errors can be conclusively presumed."), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1129 (1995); see
also Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV.
2001, 2017-18 (1998) (describing the proper remedy for a Batson violation).
184 See, e.g., Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162, 170-71 (8th Cir. 1995); Rosa v. Peters, 36 F.3d
625, 634 n.17 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1261 (9th Cir. 1987).
1S5 Muller, supra note 64, at 103 (noting the majority of the justices on the Supreme Court
have rejected the theory of difference that says that a juror's race and gender are at the very least
a minimal predictor of their perspective and will likely influence their deliberations).
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reversal, yet the whole jury is supposed to be impartial as a prerequi-
site for jury service.
A court finding an error to be a trial error under the harmless error
analysis is analogous to the same decision affirmative defense permit-
ted in employment discrimination cases. The same decision affirma-
tive defense allows an employer to make an employment decision
adverse to the plaintiff based on a racial motivation, so long as there
are other motivations such that the employer can show that he would
have taken the same action regardless of the discriminatory reason.
The same formula is the basis for the dual motivation analysis for
Batson violations. If the prosecution can show they would have struck
the juror regardless of the discriminatory reason, then the peremptory
challenge should be allowed. By this reasoning, the dual motivation
analysis is like the harmless error test. Therefore, the dual motivation
approach likens the illegitimate discriminatory reason to a discrete
error that has no effect on the outcome of the trial.
Conversely, the structural defect standard that federal courts apply
to Batson violations is similar to the tainted decision-making ap-
proach. The Supreme Court's recognition of a select group of errors
that it deems to be so egregious as to compromise the accuracy of the
entire trial, including the exclusion of members of the defendant's
race from grand jury service, demonstrates the magnitude of the harm
of Batson violations. This view, combined with the federal courts'
treatment of Batson violations as necessitating per se reversal of the
conviction, leaves only one plausible solution to the mixed motive
problem-the tainted decision-making approach. To reduce the num-
ber of Batson violations that are challenged on appeal after a full trial,
thus wasting valuable court resources, all courts should use the tainted
decision-making approach to preempt the violations before they occur
and eliminate race as a motive in voir dire.
B. The Availability of Evidence
Another flaw in the extension of equal protection jurisprudence to
Batson challenges is the variation in the amount of evidence that is
available to courts when assessing an employment discrimination
claim versus a Batson challenge. In an employment discrimination
case, a jury is able to examine evidence as to whether an employer
treated similarly situated applicants the same. 186 If the employer can
show that the same decision would have been made-namely the
African-American would not have been hired-absent a discrimina-
186 Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 927 (1989) (mer.) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tory motive, then the discriminatory motive is overlooked. 87 When an
employer hires a white candidate over an African-American candi-
date, a juror can assess the employer's motives by examining whether
the particular white candidate's qualifications were superior to those
of the African-American candidate. 188 A juror can compare the two
applicants side-by-side and see if there were other legitimate reasons
for the employer's decision not to hire the African-American. Addi-
tionally, the plaintiff can produce evidence that other qualified Afri-
can-American applicants were also turned down for the position.
In an employment discrimination claim, as in Costa where an em-
ployment relationship existed at the time of the alleged discrimina-
tion, there is likely to be even more evidence available upon which a
court can base its decision. 89 The plaintiff's personnel file would
likely be available, providing a context for the claim. Fellow employ-
ees could be called to testify about the plaintiffs allegations of dispa-
rate treatment by management. Former employees that were termi-
nated for similar grounds could be called to testify to substantiate the
plaintiffs claim. In many employment discrimination cases, there is
adequate evidence available to the plaintiff to prove his case.
Batson challenges are inherently more difficult to prove because of
the lack of meaningful evidence. Even if the court has records of the
race or gender of the jurors that were struck, and there are transcripts
of the questioning of particular jurors, this information does not tell
the whole story. The empanelling of a jury and the questioning of a
potential juror takes place over a very short amount of time and is
easily manipulated based on the relatively loose standards for
plausible race-neutral reasons. A minimal amount of questioning of
an undesirable juror could lead to any number of "acceptable" reasons
for striking the juror. Extending the questioning of a juror is also a
frequent tactic to assure the attorney has sufficient race-neutral
reasons for striking the juror. The Supreme Court has affirmed the use
of silly and implausible reasons for striking jurors as long as they do
not involve race or are a pretext for race. 90 This is a very low
standard to meet, which makes for a large number of permissible
reasons for striking a juror. This leaves the defendant under-protected




189 See David A. Sutphen, Note, True Lies: The Role of Pretext Evidence Under Batson v.
Kentucky in the Wake of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 94 MICH L. REv. 488, 507 (1995)
(describing the problem of analogizing the Hicks decision to Batson cases because they are
contextually distinct).
190 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
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of a peremptory challenge is the true reason. Justice Marshall scolded
courts for using the employment discrimination standard saying, "[a]
'but for' test is inappropriate in the Batson inquiry ... because of the
special difficulties of proof that a court applying that standard to a
prosecutor's peremptory-challenge decisions necessarily would
encounter."' 191
Putting the original intent of the peremptory challenge aside, in a
perfect system trial lawyers would not dare consider race-based rea-
sons for excusing jurors and they would always be forthright about
their true reason for asserting a peremptory strike when their actions
were subject to a Batson challenge. In reality, though, "[t]he criteria
underlying a prosecutor's peremptory challenges are private; a fact-
finder therefore lacks an independent means of evaluating the prose-
cutor's decision making."'192 Only the prosecutor knows the true rea-
son why he is striking the juror and a jury may never know.
Therefore, when a prosecutor is honest and admits one of his illegiti-
mate motives for striking a juror, we should take the admission for
what it is-racial discrimination in violation of Batson.
Critics would argue that the same problem arises in employment
discrimination decisions. Employers likely know better than to assert
race as a reason for failing to hire or terminate a member of a pro-
tected class, instead they prefer to state another reason. Of course,
there will always be the opportunity for people to lie and present a
reason that will satisfy the race-neutral requirement. However, it is
easier to present a subjective reason for a peremptory challenge-
which is completely unverifiable at a later time-than it would be to
include false reports in a personnel file and persuade other employees
to perjure themselves to make an employment decision appear legiti-
mate. Courts differ on the types of reasons they will deem race-
neutral. However, many courts will accept reasons such as failure to
maintain eye contact, the juror was giving the attorney a blank stare,
the juror was too young, or the juror was too old. It is possible for the
attorney to go into voir dire having a few of these "plausible" reasons
in the back of his mind and to use them if he is unable to assert an-
other race-neutral reason for striking the juror.
There are many examples of this improper, unethical behavior in
the system, and in some egregious situations attorneys are being in-
structed on how to exercise their peremptory challenges to exclude
undesirable minority jurors in a way that will appear legitimate.'93 In
191 Wilkerson, 493 U.S. at 926 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 927.
193 See Fear ofa Black Jury, HARPER'S MAG., July 2000, at 26. This article notes that the
Philadelphia District Attorney's Office showed an instructional videotape to its prosecutors on
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Justice Marshall's words, "A judicial inquiry designed to safeguard a
criminal defendant's basic constitutional rights should not rest on the
unverifiable assertions of a prosecutor who, having admitted to racial
bias, subsequently attempts to reconstruct what his thought process
would have been had he not entertained such bias."'
' 94
The Court's recent decision in Costa, holding that direct evidence
is not required to prevail on an employment discrimination claim,
makes it easier for plaintiffs to prevail. 195 Even though this higher
burden is no longer required in employment discrimination cases, the
tainted decision-making approach already meets that burden. The
tainted decision-making approach is consistent with the idea that di-
rect evidence of discrimination will not be tolerated in jury selection.
In Batson mixed motive cases, there will always be direct evidence of
discrimination because the prosecutor's race-based reason for the
strike is direct evidence of racial discrimination. The South Carolina
Supreme Court has said, "Any consideration of discriminatory factors
in this decision is in direct contravention of the purpose of Batson
which is to ensure peremptory strikes are executed in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner."' 96 There is no need to require additional evidence
because the evidentiary burden is inherently high in a Batson chal-
how to avoid a Batson challenge. Id. The instructions included questioning African-American
jurors at length so the prosecutor would have as much ammunition as possible if a Batson chal-
lenge was later made. Id. They were instructed to write down reasons for striking the African-
American juror so they could show the judge later. Id.
194 Wilkerson, 493 U.S. at 927-28. The meaning.of "direct evidence" has proved confusing
in employment discrimination cases. Some courts apply the dictionary definition: "evidence,
which if believed proves existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption." LARSON,
supra note 133, § 8.07 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 460 (6th ed. 1990)). The use of this
definition would limit evidence to testimony from the decision-maker that he made the adverse
employment decision based on a person's protected characteristic. Id. Other jurisdictions use
variations of the traditional approach: "evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find,
by a preponderance of the evidence, a causal link between an adverse employment action and a
protected personal characteristic." Id. (quoting Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1294
(11 th Cir. 1999)). This would include such evidence as a supervisor saying "[a woman] is not
mechanically inclined" and therefore he would not promote a woman to a position that required
a woman to answer technical questions on a hotline. Id.
195 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003).
'96 Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 49 (1992) ("The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted
on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community." (quoting Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986))); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991) ("Active dis-
crimination ... during the process [of jury selection] condones violations of the United States
Constitution within the very institution entrusted with its enforcement, and so invites cynicism
respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law."); Rector v. State, 444
S.E.2d 862, 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) ("[W]hile we realize that it is unrealistic to expect trial
counsel to put aside every improper influence when selecting a juror, we conclude that is ex-
actly what the law requires." (quoting Speaker v. State, 740 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987))).
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lenge with mixed motives, but luckily the prosecutor gave the best
evidence a defendant could hope for-a statement on the record that
he struck a juror based on his race.
C. The Spirit of Batson
The employment discrimination dual motivation doctrine is not
consistent with equal protection and the theory behind Batson. The
momentous decision in Strauder over a century ago held that an Afri-
can American defendant is denied equal protection when members of
his race are purposefully excluded from the venire) 97 The Batson
Court relied on Strauder when it said, "That decision laid the founda-
tion for the Court's unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimina-
tion in the procedures used to select the venire from which individual
jurors are drawn."'198 The Court also cited the Strauder opinion for the
proposition that the main purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to end governmental discrimination on account of race.199 The Batson
opinion clearly states that the exclusion of African Americans from
jury service is precisely what the Fourteenth Amendment is designed
to protect against.200
Batson held the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids peremptory challenges to jurors solely based on
their race.20 1 The main purpose of the case was to make the exercise
of peremptory challenges based on race unconstitutional.20 2 By bla-
tantly allowing prosecutors to cite race-based reasons when making
peremptory challenges, courts are sanctioning discrimination so long
as the illegitimate race-based reason is accompanied by a legitimate
reason.
The tainted decision-making approach is preferable for policy rea-
sons as well. Under the dual motivation approach, if a prosecutor as-
serts mixed motives for ten peremptory strikes and he is able to show
he would have struck the jurors even if only the race-neutral reasons
were present, then ten minorities will be excluded from the jury. In
197 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The Supreme Court began its discus-
sion in Batson by emphasizing that the decision in Strauder was the foundation of the opinion.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
198Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
1" Id.200 Id.
201 Id. at 86; see also Brooks, supra note 112, at 336-37. Arguments for a literal interpreta-
tion of the word "solely" are made to justify the mixed motive approach. Id. There is no other
language in the opinion to support this interpretation, and a court that used this interpretation in
support of the mixed motive approach cautioned that it is dangerous to seize on one word and
make rules based on that one word. Id. at 337.202Batson, 476 U.S. at 80.
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the same scenario under the tainted decision-making approach, all of
the minority jurors would remain. The harm in the first scenario is to
limit the jury's exposure to the experiences of the minority jurors
based on suspect reasons and potentially bias the entire jury against
the defendant by excluding members of a particular class of people.
In the second scenario, the harm would be to potentially allow onto
the jury a small number of minorities who could be biased, according
to the inherently suspect reasons given by the prosecutor. The likeli-
hood that all minorities on a jury would be biased seems unlikely and
further illustrates the harm that Batson violations promote.
The tainted decision-making approach is the proper response to
mixed motives in peremptory challenges. This Note recognizes that
there is the incentive for dishonest attorneys to be untruthful under
both systems, but the dual motivation approach is sending the same
message that equal protection forbids-that it is okay to consider race
in the decision-at least so long as there are other factors. A Batson
challenge requires the prosecutor to stand in front of the judge, the
jury, and members of the public and assert a reason for his challenge.
If jurors hear the prosecutor asserting a race-conscious reason for
striking other potential jurors, they will not trust the fairness of a sys-
tem that is supposed to protect the accused. To allow a prosecutor to
publicly articulate a reason that is race-conscious to defend his strike
threatens the legitimacy of the jury system and the public's faith in
the system and should not be tolerated.
The tainted decision-making approach is consistent with Batson's
goal of removing discrimination from the jury selection process. One
of the three main goals of the Batson decision was to legitimize the
jury system to the public. The Court emphasized the impact of the
"state's continued participation in a judicial system that discriminates
against individuals based on their race harms the community as a
whole by destroying its confidence in and regard for the judicial sys-
tem as a whole. 2 °3 The Court in Price Waterhouse balanced the harm
of potentially allowing discrimination in employment decisions with
the importance of allowing employers to have the freedom to make
important employment decisions. 204 The Court recognized the impor-
tance of protecting the freedoms of employers who are private actors.
There is no such justification when the state's interest in discriminat-
ing is weighed against the constitutional rights of the accused and the
potential jurors. The potential harm to the public's perception of the
legitimacy of the system and the rights of the excluded juror and de-
203 Id. at 87.
204 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
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fendant weigh heavily against allowing a prosecutor to use race as a
factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky has led to
confusion and inconsistencies in its attempt to eradicate racial dis-
crimination in the jury selection process. The decision forced prose-
cutors to explain their use of a peremptory challenge, contrary to its
intended purpose as a means of striking jurors without the need to
give a reason. The Court later went on to contradict its previous equal
protection decisions by saying that the race of a juror does not impact
his decision-making in coming to a verdict. And finally, lower courts
have used the dual motivation approach to analyze mixed motive
cases. This approach allows prosecutors to openly consider race as a
factor when striking a juror, blatantly disregarding the purpose of
Batson.
The Batson Court was unambiguous in its decree that discrimina-
tion should not play a factor in the jury selection process. Discrimina-
tion during voir dire violates the rights of the defendant and the ex-
cluded juror and hurts the community at large by undermining the
legitimacy of the system. The tainted decision-making approach, by
unequivocally rejecting the use of race in peremptory strikes, is the
only method of analyzing mixed motives in peremptory challenges
that is consistent with Batson. The tainted decision-making approach
is also consistent with courts' classification of Batson violations as
structural defects warranting the reversal of the defendant's convic-
tion. Courts have held that a Batson violation affects the reliability of
a trial and is not a harmless error. The tainted decision-making ap-
proach recognizes the seriousness of racial discrimination and does
not tolerate it in the jury selection process.
The Court's analogy of Batson challenges to employment dis-
crimination cases has proven unworkable and impractical. Batson
claims can only be proven with transcripts of questions, the racial
composition of the petit jury and the prosecutor's feeble excuses for
striking a juror. Employment discrimination claims involve witness
testimony, examination of the employer's prior employment deci-
sions, the plaintiff's testimony, the plaintiffs personnel file, and
many other tangible factors. These disparities in available evidence
make the analogy impractical. Even if the Supreme Court continues to
apply the employment discrimination analogy to Batson challenges,
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and its decision in Costa holding that
any consideration of race in an employment decision is illegal, de-
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mands the rejection of the dual motivation approach. The Supreme
Court has held that race may not play a factor in employment deci-
sions, opening the door for it to decide the proper approach to a
mixed motive Batson case is the tainted decision-making approach.
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